President Biden took a risk by easing sanctions on Venezuela in exchange for Nicolás Maduro’s promise of a free and fair presidential election. With the election less than two weeks away, there are concerns about its legitimacy as the government has banned the most popular opposition candidate, blocked EU monitors, and harassed opposition supporters. The U.S. and Venezuelan authorities resumed talks, and American diplomats are working to ensure the election’s integrity. If a new administration under Donald Trump comes into power, the engagement efforts may cease. Success for Biden could mean a significant foreign policy win, potentially facilitating the return of Venezuelan exiles and reducing Venezuela’s alliances with Russia, China, and Iran. It could also expand U.S. access to Venezuelan oil. Despite these hurdles, opposition candidate Edmundo González remains optimistic, leading in the polls and hoping for a transformative victory that would force Maduro into negotiations. Maduro has managed to stay in power despite economic collapse and numerous crises, including U.S. sanctions. The Biden administration’s strategy included an agreement to lift most sanctions if Maduro ensured a competitive election, but this was jeopardized when Venezuela’s supreme court ruled the leading opposition candidate, María Corina Machado, ineligible. This led to the reinstatement of some sanctions. Former U.S. Ambassador Bill Brownfield criticized the U.S. deal for being overly lenient. Maduro received all the benefits from a deal in exchange for future promises, which he did not fulfill. The opposition was largely excluded from these negotiations, but opposition leader Machado has effectively leveraged the situation. Sociologist David Smilde views the Biden administration’s efforts as successful in drawing the opposition back into electoral politics. Although Maduro initially seemed to follow a more repressive path, he has agreed to participate in elections with some international oversight. Carolina Jiménez Sandoval identifies slight progress amidst ongoing repression in Venezuela. There is regional emphasis on ensuring a peaceful transition of power if Maduro loses, with leaders like Colombia’s President Petro and Brazil’s President Lula discussing immunity for the losing side. Various proposals to protect Maduro and his allies in a post-election scenario are being explored, including parliamentary immunity and reduced sentences for implicated officials. Original text by Ana Vanessa Herrero, Samantha Schmidt and Karen DeYoung, published in->TWP

Speculation arises about whether the Biden administration’s actions are undermining Venezuela’s democratic opposition, although it isn’t explicitly seeking to do so. Recent interactions between the U.S. and the Maduro regime, including a significant meeting on July 3, have raised concerns. Historically, the Maduro regime has manipulated the electoral process, including barring opposition candidates like Maria Corina Machado and revoking invitations for EU election monitoring. The EU and human rights organizations have voiced their concern over these undermining tactics. Despite these developments, the U.S. sought meetings with Maduro’s officials. According to official statements, the U.S. aimed to push for inclusive elections, but skepticism remains regarding the efficacy of such demands. Human rights abuses, such as the detention of lawyer Rocio San Miguel, highlight ongoing oppression under Maduro. Venezuela’s oil production has significantly increased, attributed to easing U.S. sanctions and actions of firms like Chevron. However, such economic moves are unlikely to influence oil prices meaningfully and raise questions about the U.S.’ interests. Critics argue that the Biden administration may not be effectively consulting with Venezuela’s democratic opposition and could be unintentionally strengthening Maduro’s regime. An impending election raises doubts about fairness and possible subsequent U.S. actions, whether they will reignite sanctions or ease further into diplomatic ties with Maduro. The future of U.S. policy on Venezuela remains uncertain, with significant skepticism about its impact on democracy and human rights in the country. Original Text by Elliott Abrams, published in -> CouncilonForeugnRelations

Biden revokes, in April,  temporary sanctions on Venezuela’s energy sector due to concerns about its cooperation with Iranian agents. During the waiver period, it was found that Iran used Venezuela to plan attacks on the U.S. Despite this, the Biden administration has not yet strictly enforced sanctions on Venezuela to address this security threat. The FBI has issued warnings about Iranian espionage activities involving Venezuela, linked to plans targeting U.S. officials. Historical connections between Iranian and Venezuelan security services, particularly the IRGC, are noted, with continuing collaboration in finance and energy sectors that defy U.S. sanctions. Stricter enforcement of sanctions is advocates as well as broader definitions of “significant support” to include various actors involved in illicit trade, emphasizing the need for economic and diplomatic accountability. They draw parallels to the Cuban Missile Crisis, urging Biden to deter threats posed by the Iran-Venezuela alliance. By Bush and Norm Roule, published in -> TheHill

President Joe Biden announced an immediate halt to asylum processing at the U.S.-Mexico border when illegal entries surpass 2,500 per day, a significant policy change amid criticism from Republicans over rising new arrivals. With current entries at approximately 4,000 daily, this measure aims to curb large-scale immigration but has raised concerns among advocates about the safety of migrants and potential violations of international obligations. Legal challenges to the policy are expected. The measure would halt asylum processes until daily illegal crossing arrests drop below 1,500 for a consecutive week, a figure last seen during the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike past restrictions under Title 42, denied asylum seekers will now face deportation orders, risking criminal prosecution and multi-year entry bans if they attempt to re-enter. Furthermore, migrants can express fears for their safety to U.S. asylum officers but under stricter standards than before. Questions remain about the logistical feasibility, as Mexico will only accept a limited number of non-Mexican deportees, and there are significant barriers to deporting migrants to distant countries. Unaccompanied children are exempt from these rules, potentially encouraging families to send minors alone. Mexico plays a crucial role in assisting the U.S. with immigration challenges. The U.S. faces difficulties deporting people to over 100 countries due to limited funding, diplomatic leverage, and logistical hurdles. A 1997 court ruling restricts the detention of families with children under 18 to 20 days, complicating efforts to deport them swiftly. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is also limited by funding, with resources to detain only about 34,000 single adults at a time. Mexico has agreed to accept up to 30,000 individuals monthly from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, but not from other countries. Additionally, Mexico has tightened measures to prevent migrants from reaching the U.S. border by limiting travel on freight trains and buses, which has resulted in many migrants being stranded in Mexican cities. Alicia Bárcena, Mexico’s foreign relations secretary, stated that the country would not permit more than 4,000 illegal entries daily. President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum is expected to maintain current policies. Previous efforts to deter asylum seekers under the Biden and Trump administrations had limited success due to resource constraints. A specific rule under the Immigration and Nationality Act used by both administrations has been contested by advocacy groups. Original Text by Elliot Spagat, published in -> Chapelboro.

Venezuela’s upcoming presidential election on July 28 is widely anticipated to be neither free nor fair. Opposition candidate Maria Corina Machado has been prohibited from running, and her substitute has also been barred. The regime has announced the exclusion of EU election observers and has altered polling places to confuse voters. These measures are likely necessary for President Nicolás Maduro, who is polling at less than 20%, and in some polls, under 10%. Separate from the election, a U.S. federal judge is proceeding with the sale of Venezuela’s largest asset, the CITGO oil company, marking the largest court auction of an asset in history. This decision has been termed “truly extraordinary” and “rare,” with CITGO considered an alter ego of Venezuela, which allows creditors to benefit first from the auction due to crimes like expropriations committed by the Maduro regime. There are suspicions that the U.S. State Department may have a covert involvement in this process. This situation is seen as beneficial to Maduro. Since 2019, CITGO’s board has been under Venezuela’s opposition’s control, countering Maduro. If CITGO is lost, Maduro is expected to blame the opposition for losing “Venezuela’s foreign crown jewel” and its most valuable foreign asset. The auction’s timing is considered poorly planned as it concludes just weeks before the Venezuelan election. The legal processes around CITGO have been ongoing since 2017, raising the question of why they must conclude imminently before the election. Approving the final sale of CITGO requires a license from the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the Treasury. Some argue that the Biden administration could mitigate the potential repercussions by writing to the court to request a delay in the final hearing, pointing out that the auction’s timing—originally set before the election date was announced—now appears harmful to U.S. foreign policy and advantageous to Maduro. Although there’s no certainty this would succeed, not making the attempt seems inexcusable. Original text by by Elliott Abrams, published in -> CouncilonForeignRelations

What are  the potential global consequences if the United States abandons its role of maintaining a liberal world order? This scenario denotes a shift from 80 years of American strategy. Donald Trump’s presidency marked a move towards this notion with his “America first” platform, emphasizing minimal global entanglements and prioritizing U.S. interests. Trump’s perspective is gaining traction within the Republican Party, and bipartisan weariness with globalism suggests this shift could happen under future leaders. A more self-interested U.S. would likely be more aggressive on certain issues but less inclined to uphold global norms, provide public goods, or protect distant allies, focusing instead on power without the same sense of responsibility. While such a strategy may benefit the U.S. temporarily, it could lead to increased global chaos and conflict, adversely affecting vulnerable states. Historically, U.S. foreign policy has been driven by a broad, responsible view of national interest, emphasizing global stability and cooperation. The shift to a narrower, self-serving strategy represents a serious departure from this approach, with potentially deleterious effects on global order and peace. Since 1945, American leadership has fostered global growth, security, and the spread of democracy. Despite this success, there has always been skepticism about maintaining this global order indefinitely. Initially driven by unique post-war conditions, U.S. foreign policy aimed at preventing further global conflicts. However, more recent trends indicate a shift towards a less interventionist approach. This shift is epitomized by Trump’s “America First” agenda, which questions the need for the U.S. to defend distant states and uphold global liberal norms. Instead, it favors a more conventional focus on direct American interests, reducing commitments to global alliances and liberal order maintenance. This approach could lead to a more protectionist and transactional U.S. foreign policy, less concerned with promoting democracy and more focused on economic advantages and homeland defense. If applied consistently, “America First” would reshape U.S. relations with rival powers, encouraging friction primarily over direct threats rather than ideological conflicts. The U.S. would remain a dominant power, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, but its role on the global stage would be more self-centered and less liberal. The critique of the “America first” policy highlights its potential consequences for global stability. Historically, American leadership has played an essential role in maintaining global order, preventing conflicts, and countering autocratic powers. Despite a decline in relative power compared to its peak in 1945 or 1991, the United States still underpins much of the current geopolitical stability, as evidenced by its support for Ukraine against Russia and its crucial role in NATO, Asia, and the Middle East. Advocates of American retrenchment believe that it will encourage other nations to step up, but critics argue that this vacuum would likely be filled by aggressive states like Russia and China. This shift could lead to increased instability in regions such as Eastern Europe and the South China Sea, undermine international norms, and escalate arms races, possibly even nuclear proliferation. For the United States, a retreat from its leadership role might not immediately jeopardize its security, due to its strong geopolitical position and economic advantages. However, the resulting global instability could cause economic disruptions that would also affect the U.S., although it might still fare better than other nations. The overall assessment is that “America first” could lead to a more chaotic and dangerous world, even if the U.S. itself remains relatively insulated from the immediate fallout. American power supports the current global order, ensuring stability in Europe and East Asia. If the United States retrenched, countries would face increased defense costs and regional rivalries. European and Asian nations would suffer from disrupted Middle Eastern trade routes, and even China, reliant on foreign trade, would be harmed. The U.S. would eventually face economic and diplomatic coercion from a dominant China and deteriorating global conditions. Historically, the U.S. has reengaged globally from weaker positions after prolonged isolation. “America first” policies might temporarily shield the U.S., but long-term consequences would affect it and other nations adversely. Original text by Hal Brands, published in-> ForeignAffairs

Durante la tercera Reunión Ministerial de la Declaración de Los Ángeles sobre Migración y Protección celebrada en la Ciudad de Guatemala, Estados Unidos anunció que proporcionaría casi 578 millones de dólares en asistencia humanitaria, económica y de desarrollo. Esta financiación tiene como objetivo ayudar a los países socios y las comunidades de acogida a responder a las necesidades humanitarias urgentes, ampliar las vías de migración legal y apoyar la regularización e integración de los migrantes. El monto incluye $459 millones para poblaciones vulnerables, incluidos migrantes, refugiados y personas desplazadas en toda la región, con casi $83 millones específicamente para las necesidades más urgentes de los venezolanos vulnerables. Debido a la actual inestabilidad política y económica en Venezuela, más de 7,7 millones de personas necesitan asistencia humanitaria y otros 7,7 millones de venezolanos han migrado o han sido desplazados por la fuerza. Se están proporcionando otros 376 millones de dólares a través del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos para refugiados, solicitantes de asilo, desplazados internos, apátridas y migrantes vulnerables. Estos fondos entregarán ayuda alimentaria y nutricional de emergencia a los migrantes y refugiados venezolanos, y las poblaciones vulnerables en Venezuela también recibirán atención médica, ayuda alimentaria, agua, mejores servicios de saneamiento, educación sobre higiene y otros suministros que se necesitan con urgencia. Por último, junto con este total de $459 millones de asistencia humanitaria, USAID, junto con el Congreso, planea proporcionar casi $116 millones en asistencia económica, de salud y de desarrollo para apoyar la regularización y la integración socioeconómica de los migrantes en Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Brasil, Belice, Costa Rica. Rica y Panamá, sujeto a disponibilidad de fondos. Estos fondos tienen como objetivo conectar a los migrantes con procesos de determinación de estatus legal y servicios de atención médica, educación, finanzas y capacitación y colocación laboral, y también brindar apoyo a las comunidades de acogida para permitir que los migrantes contribuyan rápidamente a sus nuevas comunidades. Texto Original -> DoS

Hace casi dos años, el presidente Biden emitió la Declaración de Los Ángeles sobre Migración y Protección, respaldada por 20 líderes de todo el hemisferio occidental. Este es el primer marco de este tipo que promueve una acción coordinada bajo tres pilares: (1) abordar las causas fundamentales y apoyar la integración de los migrantes para una estabilización a largo plazo; (2) ampliar las vías legales; (3) fortalecer la aplicación humanitaria de la ley. El 7 de mayo de 2024, Guatemala fue sede de la tercera reunión ministerial de la Declaración, donde participaron ministros de Relaciones Exteriores y altos representantes de 20 países firmantes. El secretario de Estado, Antony Blinken, encabezó la delegación estadounidense. Blinken también anunció 578 millones de dólares en ayuda humanitaria, económica y de desarrollo para ayudar a los países socios y las comunidades de acogida. Los países firmantes presentaron los avances que han logrado en iniciativas como fortalecer la aplicación de la ley de manera humanitaria, ampliar las vías legales para la migración y la protección y abordar las causas fundamentales y apoyar la integración de los migrantes para fomentar la estabilización a más largo plazo. Estados Unidos tomó medidas el 6 de mayo para imponer restricciones de visa a miembros ejecutivos de varias compañías navieras colombianas por facilitar la migración irregular a Estados Unidos. La cooperación entre Estados Unidos y Costa Rica se fortaleció con el establecimiento de un nuevo acuerdo de socios en el intercambio de datos biométricos. Además, Estados Unidos está desplegando recursos adicionales en Guatemala y aumentará el conocimiento público de la aplicación móvil CBP One. Además, en el contexto de la Declaración de Los Ángeles, Estados Unidos lidera el comité de acción contra la trata de personas y el tráfico de migrantes. Quienes cumplan con los requisitos para los permisos humanitarios temporales (paroles) para Cuba, Haití, Nicaragua y Venezuela (CHNV) pueden, una vez otorgado el permiso, solicitar autorización de trabajo y comenzar a trabajar de inmediato. USAID anunció nuevas iniciativas, como “Vecinos Laborales”, para aumentar el acceso a vías legales de empleo temporal para nuevos países de origen y destino de migrantes. Por último, los firmantes reafirmaron su compromiso de abordar las razones subyacentes de la migración con compromisos de varios países para luchar contra la trata de personas y la migración irregular. Texto Original -> Diario de Tijuana

An increase in migrants from countries without diplomatic ties to the United States has aggravated an already difficult challenge at the U.S. southern border, Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said in an interview. By Matias J Ocner and Whitney Shefte. Full Video -> MiamiHerald

 As Venezuela’s future enters a critical phase, the time to turn these words into action is now—starting with the critical decision regarding sanctions snapback on April 18. The time has come for the Biden administration to support Machado and trusted members of the Unitary Platform by returning to a policy aimed at political change as opposed to accommodation and election-year political exigencies. After all, the efforts of Machado and the Unitary Platform may be the country’s last shot to restore democracy. By Ryan C. Berg and Alexandra Winkler. Full Text-> CSIS