China’s mounting influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been the subject of study and consternation in U.S. policy circles for well over a decade. In this time, the multifaceted and ever-evolving contours of China’s engagement with the region have been traced and retraced continuously. An especially concerning area of research in this regard has been the possibility that Chinese economic, diplomatic, security, and political activities within the region could be contributing to the democratic backsliding witnessed in recent decades. Full Video -> CSIS

Tres fuerzas se han unido en la región: China, Rusia e Irán. Su objetivo: imponer un nuevo orden mundial. “Después del colapso de la Unión Soviética estos tres países tenían una red en Latinoamérica. Irán inmediatamente vino a recoger algunas de esas piezas, China llegó más tarde, pero hizo lo mismo, así como Rusia también, y en lugar de competir entre ellos terminaron trabajando juntos. Hoy, en términos de sincronización, no existe región en el mundo en donde estos tres países tengan mayor penetración que en América Latina” Y es bajo este escenario en que Irán juega un papel protagónico. “Irán no sería lo que es hoy en día sin el apoyo de China, y China difícilmente logrará su cometido sin la ayuda de Irán. Cuando China se quite la máscara de panda rojo que lleva puesta, veremos sus verdaderos intereses. Mientras tanto, deja que Irán haga el trabajo sucio”. Por Sabina Nicholls . Texto Completo ->Diálogo Americas 

This report seeks to more fully enumerate the nature of China’s impact on democracy in LAC. It posits two independent but correlated mechanisms through which China contributes to democratic backsliding. First, the PRC propagates its model of authoritarian governance through its soft power engagements in media, education, and people-to-people diplomacy, as well as through its security assistance, which often features tools enabling mass surveillance and the curtailment of civil and political rights. Second, China protects regimes undergoing democratic backsliding by providing economic and diplomatic cover even as these governments become increasingly isolated from the rest of the international system, in effect extending these governments beyond their natural lifespan. Having recognized the specific risk vectors China’s engagement poses in LAC, the report seeks to articulate the beginnings of a democracy-first grand strategy for the United States to pursue. Such a strategy should proceed along the lines of the “insulate, curtail, compete” framework outlined in a previous CSIS report. by Ryan C. Berg and Henry Ziemer. Full Text -> CSIS

President Joe Biden’s top Latin America adviser is stepping down, a move that may complicate a US push for democratic reforms in Venezuela in exchange for sanctions relief Juan Gonzalez, special assistant to Biden and the National Security Council’s senior director for the Western Hemisphere, is set to depart in mid-March and will be replaced by Daniel Erikson, the current deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Western Hemisphere, who also has advised Biden, an NSC spokesperson confirmed to Bloomberg News. Both Gonzalez and Erikson advised Biden when he was vice president. By Eric Martin and Patricia Laya. Full Text -> Bloomberg

La democracia en América Latina está en declive.Siguen aumentando las autocracias en la región. Según el Índice de democracia global de IDEA Internacional 2021 “más de la mitad de las democracias en América Latina y el Caribe sufren erosión democrática”. El equilibrio de poderes se ve amenazado en muchos países, incluyendo el contrapoder de la prensa y la sociedad civil, porque el espacio cívico sigue restringiéndose. Indica el reporte del Monitor Cívico del 2021 que, de 35 países en el continente americano, sólo en 10 el espacio cívico es abierto, 18 son estrechos u obstruidos, y cinco cerrados; esto indica que la mayor parte de la ciudadanía regional (87%) viven sin condiciones básicas de respeto a la sociedad civil. Además, la región sigue encabezando los ataques y asesinatos a activistas y periodistas. Por: Gina Romero. Texto Completo -> RLCD

The Global North has three major misconceptions about Latin America’s foreign policy. First, the region is assumed to be a homogeneous and turbulent group of small countries with no ability to influence the major issues of global politics. Second, there’s a sense that given a permanent climate of conflict and political-institutional instability in most of these countries, their leaders’ attention is focused almost exclusively on domestic politics, while their interest in international politics is basically limited to surviving among the tensions and interests of the great powers on which their economy depends. Finally, there’s a misunderstanding that Latin American countries have not been able to consolidate a regional integration scheme capable of surviving the ups and downs of politics and the change of political coalitions. Let’s look at each of these in turn. By Daniela Sepúlved. Full Text -> AmericasQuarterly

This is the situation report published by “Hope without Borders,” World Vision’s Multi-Country Response to the Venezuela Crisis. It highlights the current situation of vulnerable Venezuelan people, both inside and outside the country, as well as the main actions and our response in the first quarter of 2023 in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

For several years, a series of multifactorial factors have been prompting people to leave Venezuela and seek better living conditions for themselves and their families in other countries. The political, economic, and social crisis in Venezuela and the region are contributing to the accelerated deterioration of the situation of food insecurity, limited or no access to basic services, lack of employment opportunities, absence of protection systems (especially for children and adolescents), violence, and xenophobia experienced by vulnerable Venezuelan people.

You can help Venezuelan children and adolescents overcome their vulnerability in the region by supporting our work.

Full report-> WorldVision

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But a key region seems to be flying under the radar: Latin America. What is U.S. policy toward its own neighborhood? Does the U.S. even have a policy toward the region?

At best, one could say that U.S. policy toward Latin America is a piecemeal and inconsistent amalgam of sporadic attempts at engagement. A case in point is last year’s  failed Summit of the Americas, when a number of key regional leaders declined to even attend after Washington excluded Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua from the gathering. The lack of coherence is unfortunate. We can debate U.S. engagement in Asia, Europe and the Middle East ad nauseum, and often do. But all of that takes a back seat to the importance of U.S. engagement to solidify relations with its neighbors. Full Text-> World Political Review

Recent political events highlight a warning for Latin American democracies when party systems fail, and outsider leaders take over promising to end establishment corruption.

Peru experiences widespread unrest and protests demanding the president’s resignation, while Brazil tries to manage a far-right movement that is unwilling to support democracy. Mexico will constrain the agency that oversees elections with a series of measures championed by President López Obrador. In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele weakened the system of checks and balances, declared a state of emergency, and suspended key constitutional rights. These cases are a result of a virulent strain of populism rooted primarily in citizens’ frustration with corruption.

 Anti-corruption populism has not produced the desired effects in Latin America. The resulting political and economic instability and democratic backsliding have only led to more widespread corruption and social conflicts. The strong tendency toward messianic leaders and the inadequacy of established political parties have created a wave of instability in the region. Peru, with the rise of Fujimori in 1990, was one of the first countries to experience this movement. Even now, with the emergence of leaders like Bolsonaro in Brazil, López Obrador in Mexico and Bukele in El Salvador, the trend persist.

The rise of outsider candidates signals a breakdown in the credibility of political parties and widens political instability. Party systems have been pulverized, leading to prolonged periods of unreliable governance and an inability to meet social demands. Latin American democracies have particularly suffered as the street has replaced representative institutions as the natural venue for public demands. Peru’s recent history of six presidents since 2016, political protests and civil unrest illustrate the impact of political instability. The recent presidential elections resulted in low voter support for both candidates, with the winning candidate subsequently impeached. Brazil faces similar issues, with a large number of parties sitting in Congress making legislative majorities difficult to achieve, and further weakening effective governance.

The collapse of party systems in Latin America has led to the rise of populists who regard democratic institutions as the cause of corruption. This perspective is damaging to democracy, which needs more checks and balances, rule of law and press freedom, not less. Unfortunately, the quality of the rule of law, judicial independence and press freedom has declined in the region, leading to a situation where corruption has increased. The solution is to escape this vicious cycle and build strong institutions, including robust political parties, independent judiciaries, impartial electoral authorities and legal protections for press freedom and civic activism.

This is a summary of the article  In Latin America, Populism Is Winning Over Democracy” by Kevin Casas-Zamora,

“Secretary Blinken’s trip was mostly characterized by the press as an effort to reassert Washington’s commitment to the region and meet with three new left-leaning leaders, amid concerns that neglect of the continent has let China make economic inroads. While this at 35,000 feet may be generally true, the real challenge is that the Biden administration has struggled to find partners to work with and devise policies that will gain traction as it attempts to re-engage after four years of generalized indifference from the previous administration, beyond the politically expedient pimping of Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba in Florida ahead of the 2020 elections.” By Arturo Sarukhan and otheres Full Text -> TheDialogue

Traducción de Cortesía -> “El viaje del secretario Blinken se caracterizó principalmente por la prensa como un esfuerzo por reafirmar el compromiso de Washington con la región y reunirse con tres nuevos líderes de tendencia izquierdista, en medio de preocupaciones de que el abandono del continente ha permitido que China haga avances económicos. Si bien esto a 35,000 pies puede ser cierto en general, el verdadero desafío es que la administración de Biden ha luchado para encontrar socios con quienes trabajar y diseñar políticas que ganen fuerza a medida que intenta volver a comprometerse después de cuatro años de indiferencia generalizada de la administración anterior. , más allá del proxenetismo políticamente conveniente de Venezuela, Nicaragua y Cuba en Florida de cara a las elecciones de 2020.”