The reported decline in Venezuela’s crime rate may not signify a genuine improvement in security but rather a shift in the country’s criminal landscape. In May, Venezuelan officials announced a 25.1% drop in crime compared to 2023, attributing it to large-scale operations by security forces. President Nicolás Maduro claimed the country achieved the best results in citizen security in over 20 years. This data is supported by the Venezuelan Violence Observatory, which also noted fewer violent deaths. However, underlying factors such as mass criminal migration may be more significant. Venezuela’s economic crisis has affected both citizens and criminal groups, reducing opportunities for extortion and ransom due to diminished economic activity. Prominent gangs like the Tren de Aragua and others have moved operations abroad, increasing crime and violence in countries like Chile, Colombia, and Peru by exploiting migrant vulnerabilities and poor regional coordination. Therefore, the decline in domestic crime may reflect these broader dynamics rather than effective state intervention. The territorial and criminal dominance of non-state armed groups has led to a deceptive sense of security in certain regions. The OVV report indicates that agreements between the government and some criminal groups, as well as the control of violence in certain areas, contribute to these improved security perceptions. For example, the National Liberation Army (ELN), a Colombian guerrilla group active in Venezuela, monopolized extortion in the Apure state due to favorable treatment from the Maduro administration. By assisting the Venezuelan army in expelling a rival faction, the ELN reduced competition in extortion and social control, leading some locals to feel safer under their rule. However, despite these appearances, residents still endure strict social regulations, illegal taxes, and limited mobility, with severe punishments for non-compliance. Although the Venezuelan government claims a reduction in crime, the lack of official reports and inconsistencies in data make verification difficult. Since 2015, the government has ceased publishing national and regional security data, transferring the responsibility to media and NGOs. These organizations, if not aligned with the government, face risks such as persecution. As elections approach, security remains a crucial tool for the Maduro government to bolster its waning popularity. Original Text by Venezuela Investigation Unit, publishe in-> Insightcrime

For the privilege, a bodyguard “has to be prepared to give his life for his client,” said Sako, who teaches hand-to-hand combat, target shooting and other skills. A basic protection service, with two bodyguards, will cost a client about $3,000 a month, said Sako, in a country where three in four people live in extreme poverty.The official minimum salary in Venezuela is about $30 a month. Full Text -> France24

Traducción de cortesía -> Para tener el privilegio, un guardaespaldas “tiene que estar preparado para dar su vida por su cliente”, dijo Sako, quien enseña combate cuerpo a cuerpo, tiro al blanco y otras habilidades. Un servicio básico de protección, con dos guardaespaldas, le costará a un cliente unos 3.000 dólares al mes, dijo Sako, en un país donde tres de cada cuatro personas viven en la pobreza extrema. El salario mínimo oficial en Venezuela es de unos 30 dólares al mes.

Traducción al español -> Google Translación

When Ron Santa Teresa issued its bonds, buyers assumed that a dollar-clearing system would be in place by the time they matured, so they could collect the proceeds electronically. Building that infrastructure before the bond matures now seems increasingly unlikely. So once again investors with a certain level of derring-do will be on the streets of Caracas, furtively transporting thousands of dollars of banknotes through a city suffused with criminal gangs and frequently ranked as having among the world’s highest murder rates. But at least they’ll earn some interest.By Nicolle Yapur. Full Text-> BloombergQuint

This issue brief explores data in the three countries with the largest number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees as of 2020—Colombia, Peru, and Chile, which together host more than 2 million Venezuelan nationals—to better understand whether and what sort of relationship exists between this immigration and crime rates. By Dany Bahar, Megan Dooley and Andrew Selee. Full Text-> Brookings

Between 2010 and 2018, which is the period in which the official information is best organized and continuous, some 23,688 people have died at the hands of the State security forces. Sixty-nine per cent of these cases occurred between 2016 and 2018. The death rate per 100,000 inhabitants is between 19 and 16. This is higher than the homicide rate of most countries in the world. In 2010 the rate was 2.3 and in 2018 it reached 16.6, an increase of 622%. By Keymer Ávila. Full text-> Open Democracy

The 19-year-old traveled 22 hours from La Guaira in Venezuela to work in Cucuta. Gabriela was not unaware of the job awaiting her. Like many others working in the sex industry in Cucuta, she’d heard about the opportunity from others who had already made the perilous journey across the border. By Michael Rummel. Full text -> VOA

Unrest gripped much of Latin America and the Caribbean throughout 2019. From record violence in Mexico that recalled the darkest days of the drug war, to increased fighting among armed groups in Colombia vying for control in the absence of the FARC and a rise in massacres in Honduras, the region was again one of the world’s most homicidal last year. In its annual Homicide Round-Up, InSight Crime looks into the country-by-country murder rates and the factors influencing them. by Parker Asmann and Eimhin O’Reilly. Full text -> InSight Crime